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Abstract 
Our study provides empirical evidence for matching functions with three heterogeneous groups of job seekers in 
China, and bridges the gap of matching function estimation of the Chinese labor market. We find that the effects of 
non-unemployed job seekers in the empirical matching process for China are rather significant, and an absence of their 
consideration could lead to biased estimates. Moreover, the result highlights competition among the three groups of job 
seekers in the matching process, and indicates the potential influences of productivity, job-search services, and 
economic reform shocks on their matching efficiencies.
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1. Introduction 
The matching model has been used widely in labor market issues. It provides a tool for 
fractional unemployment analysis, and enables the modeling of the contribution of job seekers 
and vacancies to new hires in an incomplete labor market (See Diamond and Maskin (1979), 
Blanchard  and  Diamond  (1989),  and  Pissarides  (2000)). Although  considerable  effort  has 
been made to estimate matching functions for numerous countries, China has been ignored. In 
order to fill this gap, we specify and estimate matching models for the Chinese labor market 
and consider heterogeneous job seekers in the matching process. 
The conventional aggregate matching function is a regression of new hires on unemployed 
persons  and  vacancies
1.  Recently,  certain  studies  have  found  that  biases  c ould  arise  if 
employed job seekers and other non-unemployed job seekers are ignored (Broersma and van 
Ours (1999), Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), Sunde (2007)). Further, other recent studies 
have  noted that  the conventional  matching  function  is  influenc ed  by  the proportion  of 
heterogeneous job seekers (Hynninen 2009). Thus, in this paper, we introduce heterogeneous 
factors  to  the  conventional  matching  function.  Further,  matching  efficiencies  are  often 
influenced by exogenous factors; the estimated scales of the matching function enable us to 
examine the determinants of matching efficiencies. 
The  segmentation  of  job  seekers  is  usually  based  on  whether  they  are  employed  or 
unemployed, depending on their employment status (van Ours (1995), Hynninen (2009), etc.). 
In the urban Chinese labor market, there is another group of job seekers: rural-urban migrants. 
They are different from employed and unemployed residents because of the strict household 
registration system. They do not receive unemployment benefits b ecause they are employed 
for farm work in rural areas, and are not officially recognized as involuntary unemployed 
persons even if they are unable to find employment. These migrants are more likely to accept 
a job than permanent residents. Thus, numerous C hinese studies divide job seekers in urban 
areas into three groups: employed, unemployed, and migrant workers (John Knight and Song 
(1995), Guihua Xie (2008), etc.) It must be noted that unemployed persons in urban China 
only include unemployed urban residents. The three above mentioned job-seeker groups seek 
employment in the same vacancy pool and possibly compete with each other. In our study, we 
examine the matching processes of each group as well as competition among the three groups. 
The data for this study has been sourced from approximately 30,000 public and private labor 
agencies in China (NBS (1999-2008)). The dataset provides the annual number of job seekers 
belonging to different groups, flow of new hires from each group, and job vacancies at the 
provincial level. The period is 1996–2008, and the analysis is conducted for a cross section of 
                                                   
1  In empirical literature, matches are usually assumed to be equal to new hires (Petrongolo 
and Pissarides (2001)). In our study, we do not consider the job-worker contacts that do not 
result in employment and assume the reject rate after contact is unrelated to job vacancy and 
job seekers.     
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29 Chinese provinces
2. The data for migrants has not been reported separately for the period 
1999–2004; thus, the adjusted periods are 1996–1999 and 2005–2008. 
 
2. Previous Studies 
There has been considerable discussion on the heterogeneity of job seekers in previous 
studies. However, the studies that utilize empirical matching functions for this purpose are not 
common  because  of  data  limitations  (Petrongolo  and  Pissarides  (2001)).  Burgess  (1993) 
examined the competition provided by employed job seekers for the unemployed, using the 
replacement ratio, the proportion of employed aged 16–19, and other factors to measure the 
propensity of the employed to engage in search. Van Ours (1995) developed two types of 
matching function forms to distinguish the case that employed and unemployed job seekers 
search in the same pool of vacancies and the case that they search in different pools, using a 
dataset of pooled 24 observations (8 regions over discrete 3 years) in Netherlands. Further, 
Broersma and van Ours (1999) used approximations for the non-unemployed job seekers (for 
instance, it is assumed that 10% of the employed work force searches for another job). A more 
recent study, Hynninen (2009), although do not have data for new hires of each job-seeker 
group, they introduce composition of job-seeker groups into the total matching function, and 
found significant heterogeneity of job seekers in matching process. Using different methods to 
overcome  data  limitations,  previous  studies  found  that  it  is  important  to  account  for  the 
behavior of non-unemployed job seekers in empirical matching functions. This is the starting 
point of our study. 
  It is noteworthy that using registered job seeker and vacancies in local labor offices and 
other public job exchanges is the most common method to collect data for matching function 
estimation. Although some studies pointed out that there could be workers and job flows 
outside the local labor office, a more complete dataset usually does not exist. The results 
obtained by those dataset highly support the theory and usually consist with each other even 
in different countries; therefore, they are widely accepted. 
 
3. Empirical Matching Functions of the Three Job-seeker Groups 
In this section, we estimate matching functions for the three job-seeker groups in China, 
and further examine competition among these groups. 
3.1 Model 
The conventional aggregate matching function is
 V aU H
u  , where 
u H represents new 
hires from among the unemployed,  U represents unemployed job seekers, and  V represents 
the total notified job vacancies (Pissarides (2001)). It must be noted that the estimates could 
be biased if there are job seekers other than unemployed persons. Therefore, we not only 
consider  the  contributions  of  job  seekers  and  vacancies  to  the  matching  result  but  also 
                                                   
2  Hong Kong, Macau, Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan are not included. 
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introduce variables of congestion externalities, which are important factors in the matching 
process. The terms of congestion externalities are based on Ibourk, etc. (2004). 
The general matching functions for each job-seeker group are given below: 
u uEUV U A H u
u    ,                                                                                        (1) 
e e EEV S A H
e
e
e   ) (  ,                                                                                    (2) 
m m EMV S A H
m
m
m   ) (  ,                                       (3) 
where 
u H ,
e H , and 
m H represent new hires from unemployed, employed, and urban-rural 
migrant  job  seekers,  respectively.U , 
e S ,  and 
m S represent  unemployed,  employed,  and 
rural-urban  migrant  job  seekers,  respectively.  Further,  , u A , e A and  m A are  matching 
efficiencies of unemployed, employed, and migrant job seekers, respectively.   
EUV ,  EEV , and EMV are efficient job vacancies for unemployed, employed, and migrant 
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R    ( it S is the total number of job seekers). These 
variables can be explained as indices of the congestion externalities from other groups of job 
seekers. 
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of job seekers cause congestion in seeking jobs, the ratios of other groups will have negative 
effects on new hires; thus, their coefficients will be significantly negative.   
The data for job seekers, job  vacancies, and new hires were obtained from public and 
private labor agencies in China. The proportion of each labor group is shown in Figure 1. 
Large-scale rural-urban immigration has led to a substantial number of migrants in the urban 
labor market. The group of employed job seekers is also considerable, and their relatively 
higher level of education and greater experience may affect other job seekers’ opportunities 
despite the relatively small proportion of the employed job seeker. 
 
                                Figure 1 
(a) Proportion of each group of job seeker      (b) Proportion of new hires from each group 
     
 
Furthermore, Table 1 presents a list of the data collected (the last three columns list the data 
used in Section 4).   
 
                      Table 1.      The Data List 
 
  U  
e S  
m S   V   u H  
e H  
m H   PRO   SEV   RES  
  3 10 *  3 10   3 10   3 10   3 10   3 10   3 10   yuan  Number  Rate 
Mean  433.3  191.7  494.8  1113.1  242.1  92.1  293.7  33966.3  1115.3  0.1 
Median  289.5  52.5  265.1  526.5  180.8  34.6  193.0  29103.3  1109.0  0.1 
Std. Dev.  495.6  343.6  713.5  1656.0  214.1  151.0  328.3  19280.8  716.5  0.0 
Skewness  2.9  3.5  3.4  3.8  1.7  3.7  2.4  1.9  0.5  2.1 
Kurtosis  14.7  17.2  15.9  20.3  6.7  19.2  9.8  7.7  3.2  9.1 
                     
Jarque-Bera  1280.1  1881.6  1584.6  2666.5  192.8  2361.1  522.0  554.2  19.3  398.5 
Pro.  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
                     
Obser.  180  180  180  180  180  180  180  375  375  174 
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3.2 Results 
We use the three-stage least squares (3SLS) analysis for the estimation, with specification 
for both the cross-section fixed effect and the period fixed effect. We performed a redundant 
fixed effect test and found that it rejects the null hypotheses that fixed effects are redundant
4. 
Furthermore, we examined the endogeneity problem in the Chinese labor market using the 
Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests. The null hypothesis that the variable under consideration can 
be treated as an exogenous variable is rejected in eq. (b) but not in eqs. (a) and (c). Therefore, 
we  estimate  a  3SLS(1)  specification  with  instruments  in  all  equations  and  a  3SLS(2) 
specification with instruments only in eq. (b). Further, the relevance and exogeneity of 
instruments have been examined. 
For the sake of comparison, we also report the results of OLS, TSLS, GMM, as well as a 
specification where effects of other job-seeker groups are ignored (in the last column of 
3SLS*). The results are reported in Table 2(t-statistic in parentheses). 
 
Table 2. Results of Matching Function Estimation for the Chinese Labor Market   
  (1) Dependant variable: 
u
it H ln  
Instruments
) (a : ( it it V U ln , ln )  it S ln , 
e
it S ln , 
u
it S ln  
  The Model  Comparison 
  3SLS(1)  3SLS(2)  OLS  TSLS  GMM  3SLS* 



























































i c   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
) (c u
t c   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj.R.  0.95  0.96  0.96  0.95  0.95  0.96 
Obser.  179  183  183  179  179  179 
p-value
1 : 0     H  
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
             
                                                   
4  The F-statistics of the cross-section fixed effect tests are 11.7, 2.5, and 4.5 in eqs. (a), (b), and 
(c), respectively, and that of the period fixed effect tests in eqs. (a), (b), and (c) are 11.3, 3.4, 
and 2.1, respectively. 
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  (2) Dependant variable: 
e
it H ln  
Instruments: ( it V ln )  it S ln , 
m
it S ln , 
u
it S ln  
  The Model  Comparison 
  3SLS(1)  3SLS(2)  OLS  TSLS  GMM  3SLS* 
e


























































i c   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
) (c e
t c   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj.R.  0.86  0.87  0.87  0.86  0.86  0.78 
Obser.  184  184  184  184  184  184 
p-value
1 : 0     H  
0.16  0.67  0.67  0.20  0.05  0.02 
  (3) Dependant variable: 
m
it H ln  
Instruments: ( it
m
it V S ln , ln )  it S ln , 
e
it S ln , 
u
it S ln  
  The Model  Comparison 
  3SLS(1)  3SLS(2)  OLS  TSLS  GMM  3SLS* 
m


























































i c   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
) (c m
t c   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj.R.  0.93  0.93  0.93  0.93  0.92  0.92 
Obser.  181  185  185  181  181  181 
p-value
1 : 0     H  
0.08  0.31  0.32  0.14  0.26  0.64 
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Notes:      ) (a   Endogenous variables are in parentheses. 
    ) ( b   Regional dummies (the cross-section fixed effect) 
) (c   Year dummies (the period fixed effect) 
 
The results reveal that all the job-seeker groups and vacancies have statistically significant 
positive coefficients, and most of the congestion externality terms have significant negative 
coefficients. Further, it is indicated that a greater number of job seekers or vacancies lead to a 
greater number of new hires, which supports the matching theory. Moreover, the matching 
processes are often affected by the congestion externalities of other groups of job seekers, 
which is consistent with our expectation. Furthermore, it is evident that the comparative 
estimates in the last column of 3SLS* (effects of other groups of job seekers are ignored) are 
biased, particularly in the unemployed and employed job-seeker groups. Therefore, we can 
conclude that in the case that congestion externalities are significant, the conventional 
matching function form could lead to misspecification. 
In this study, we also examined returns to scale since it is often of interest in studies of 
matching functions. We found that the null hypothesis of constant returns to scale is rejected 
decisively in the matching function of unemployed job seekers; however, it cannot be rejected 
in the matching functions of employed job seekers and migrants. The estimates and test 
results indicate that there could be decreasing returns to scale for unemployed job seekers (the 
sum of coefficients of  it U ln and  it V ln is less than one) and constant returns to scale for 
employed job seekers and migrants. 
Further, the results of our model (Specifications (1) and (2)) offer the following indications 
as empirical evidence of China’s labor market. First, among the three groups, the group of 
rural-urban migrants have the largest impact on the other two groups (–0.56*** and –0.42** 
in eq. (1) of 
u
it H ln , and  －5.21*** and  －5.10*** in eq. (2) of 
e
it H ln , Specs. (1) and (2), 
respectively). Second, the group of employed job-seekers is most greatly influenced by 
congestion externalities (－5.21*** and－4.69*** in Spec. (1) and－5.10*** and  －5.02*** 
in Spec. (2)). Third, externalities of employed job seekers reduces new hires from among the 
unemployed job-seekers, while there is no significant effect on rural-urban migrants (－
0.34** and  －0.24** in eq. (1) of 
u
it H ln   and  －0.59 and  －0.26 in eq. (3) of 
m
it H ln ).   
It is not surprising that rural-urban migrants in China greatly influence other job-seeker 
groups and receive few congestion externalities from employed job seekers. Firms prefer 
migrants because of their lower labor and monitor costs. Further, congestion externalities to 
migrants particularly from unemployed urban residents also exist. The reason for this could be 
that city policies protect their residents and occasionally make it compulsory for enterprises to 
employ a certain proportion of unemployed residents (Knight and Song (2005)). 
In this section we estimated the empirical matching functions of China, and confirmed the 
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competitions among job-seeker groups. It must be noted that the matching process is not only 
influenced by congestion externalities of other job seekers, but also determined by the 
efficiency of job-worker matching within the group. In the next section, we examine the 
matching efficiencies of the three job seeker groups.   
 
4. Determinants of Matching Efficiencies of Each Job-Seeker Group 
Matching efficiency is defined as the technology variable in matching functions (variables 
u A ,  e A , and  m A   in our model). There is no existing theoretical framework for determining 
matching efficiency, and previous studies often examined potential determinants on the basis 
of the actual situation (Destefanis, S. and R. Fonseca (2007)). In China’s case, the potential 
determinants could be labor productivity growth— PRO  —(Cahun and Zylberberg 2004), 
job search services provided by government and private agencies—SEV —(Petrongolo and 
Pissarides 2001), and economic reform shocks—RES .   
Further, the determinants of matching efficiency may also differ among the three job-seeker 
groups. Productivity growth could lead to difficulties in finding appropriate jobs if the group 
of workers undergoes little training; on the other hand, it could benefit the group that 
undergoes special training that is demanded by new jobs. In China, an important employment 
policy is to provide job training to unemployed residents. However, on the other hand, the 
economic reform in late 1990s destroyed millions of inefficient jobs of urban residents, and 
created new jobs. This threatened the original resident workers, while providing opportunities 
to migrant workers. We use regression to examine the possible determinants of matching 
efficiency for each job-seeker group. 
  In empirical literature, matching efficiency is usually estimated through dummy variables 
of period, regions, or both (Blanchard and Diamond 1989, etc.). Accordingly, we obtain the 


















    for 
employed, unemployed and migrant job seekers, respectively. We chose specification (1) for 
our empirical matching functions. 
The data pertaining to job search services is obtained from regional job agencies, and we 
use annual layoff and unemployment inflow during the economic reform period as the 
proxy variable of economic reform shocks. Note that economic reform came to an end in the 
early 2000s; thus, the reform shocks do not influence matching efficiency after 2004. 
Therefore, we divide our work into two periods: 1997–1998, which is the peak period of 
economic reform with reform shocks, and 2005–2008 when the period of reform was over 
and there were no economic reform shocks. The estimation method is ordinary least squares. 
The observations have been recorded for a cross section of 29 Chinese province and the 
results are reported in Table 3(t-statistic in parentheses). 
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it A  
E
it A  
M
it A  
Indep. Varia.       
it PRO    5.4
5 10
  * (1.8)  7.9
5 10
    (0.6)  －6.4
5 10
  *** (-2.9) 
it SEV   4.0
4 10
  *** (4.4)  －5.0
4 10
    (-1.2)  2.0
4 10
  *** (5.7) 
it RES   －3.8* (-1.9)  18.1 ** (2.0)  2.4 (1.6) 
1 ,  t i RES   4.4** (2.8)  －18.1 ** (-2.6)  －4.0** (-3.6) 
Constant  1.1*** (5.7)  2.4*** (3.0)  1.4*** (10.5) 





it A  
E
it A  
M
it A  
Indep. Varia.       
it PRO    3.1
5 10
  **(2.6)  －6.1
5 10
  ** (-2.1)  －2.6
5 10
  *** (-2.4) 
it SEV   2.1
4 10
  *** (5.3)  －2.0
4 10
  ** (-2.8)  1.3
4 10
  *** (3.7) 
Constant  0.9** (11.3)  2.2*** (11.2)  1.2*** (16.3) 
Adj.R.  0.27  0.10  0.17 
Coefficients of  it PRO  in the equations of 
M
it A are significantly negative, which indicates 
that the productivity growth has a rather significant negative effect on the matching efficiency 
of migrants in both the periods. The reason for this could be that the education level of rural 
migrants is rather low, and most of them do not receive sufficient job-training; thus, they 
suffer from the productivity growth. However,  it PRO    has significant positive coefficients 
in the equations of 
U
it A . It is indicated that higher productivity growth leads to a higher level 
of matching efficiency of urban residents, which could be a result of the job-training subsidy 
provided to residents. For the employed job-seeker group, although the productivity growth 
does not have a significant effect on matching efficiency in the period 1997–1998, it causes a 
significant reduction in the matching efficiency after the economic reform. This is because 
when there is a growth in productivity, employed workers may find it difficult to adapt to 
skills demanded by new jobs. 
  Further, job search services— it SEV —has rather significant positive coefficients in the 
unemployed and migrant job-seeker groups, which indicates that job search services in China 
contribute to an increase in matching efficiency in these groups. However, it appears that job 
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search services do not increase matching efficiency of employed job-seekers and have even 
led to a decrease in matching efficiency for this group in the period 2006–2008. One possible 
reason for this is that more job-searching services encourage more on-the-job searches, which 
leads to congestion within the group of employed job seekers.   
Finally,  the  result  indicates  that  economic  reform  shocks  also  influence  matching 
efficiencies. The direct impact is a significant negative effect on the matching efficiencies of 
unemployed residents (–3.8*). The reason for this could be that residents are not able to adapt 
to new jobs immediately. However, the effect of reform shocks becomes positive (4.4**) over 
a period of time. The most important reason for this could be the re-employment promotion 
policy for unemployed urban residents during the economic reform process. On the other 
hand, reform shocks have an immediate positive effect on employed and rural-urban migrant 
job-seekers (18.1** and 2.4) as they are not threatened by job destruction and could benefit 
from newly created jobs. However, this effect becomes negative over a period of time (–18.1 
** and –4.0**) for the possible reason that the job-seekers in these groups do not receive 
job-training  subsidies  and  new  jobs  are  given  to  trained  unemployed  residents  through 
government policies.   
 
5. Conclusion 
We estimated matching functions of unemployed, employed, and migrant job seekers in 
urban China. We find that the number of new hires is not only determined by the contribution 
of job seekers and vacancies, but also by congestion externalities from other groups of job 
seekers. The estimates of congestion externalities are rather significant, and not considering 
these externalities could lead to misspecification. 
Further,  we  observed  heterogeneities  of  the  three  job-seeker  groups  in  the  matching 
process.  First,  the  degrees  of  congestion  externalities  differ  among  the  three  groups: 
rural-urban migrants cause the greatest congestion externalities in other groups, and employed 
job seekers receive larger congestion externalities than the other two groups. Second, the 
influences  of  matching  efficiencies  also  vary  greatly.  Although  unemployed  job  seekers 
underwent job relocation during the economic restructuring in the 1990s, they received most 
government  support  for  skill  training  and  re-employment.  Both  productivity  growth  and 
job-search services improve their matching efficiency. Moreover, migrant job seekers also 
benefit from job-search services; however, their matching efficiencies decline as productivity 
grows because of their low skills and inadequate job training. Further, productivity growth 
had a negative effect on employed job seekers in the 2000s, and the reason for this could be 
the lack of further job training to adapt to new jobs. 
  Overall, we conclude that it is important to incorporate non-unemployed job seekers into the 
matching process and consider the heterogeneities of job-seeker groups. Future research could 
include a more detailed segmentation of job seekers, effect of endogenous job creation, and 
determinants of equilibrium unemployment. 
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